CVSS base score: 7.5 (High) CISA · v3.1
Score assigned by CISA's Vulnrichment program; the vendor's CVE record did not include one. Vulnrichment source record →
Vendor: OpenSSL Product: OpenSSL
The public API function BIO_new_NDEF is a helper function used for streaming ASN.1 data via a BIO. It is primarily used internally to OpenSSL to support the SMIME, CMS and PKCS7 streaming capabilities, but may also be called directly by end user applications. The function receives a BIO from the caller, prepends a new BIO_f_asn1 filter BIO onto the front of it to form a BIO chain, and then returns the new head of the BIO chain to the caller. Under certain conditions, for example if a CMS recipient public key is invalid, the new filter BIO is freed and the function returns a NULL result indicating a failure. However, in this case, the BIO chain is not properly cleaned up and the BIO passed by the caller still retains internal pointers to the previously freed filter BIO. If the caller then goes on to call BIO_pop() on the BIO then a use-after-free will occur. This will most likely result in a crash. This scenario occurs directly in the internal function B64_write_ASN1() which may cause BIO_new_NDEF() to be called and will subsequently call BIO_pop() on the BIO. This internal function is in turn called by the public API functions PEM_write_bio_ASN1_stream, PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream, PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream, SMIME_write_ASN1, SMIME_write_CMS and SMIME_write_PKCS7. Other public API functions that may be impacted by this include i2d_ASN1_bio_stream, BIO_new_CMS, BIO_new_PKCS7, i2d_CMS_bio_stream and i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream. The OpenSSL cms and smime command line applications are similarly affected.
No mentions found in monitored research blogs or news feeds.
| Date | Advisory | Issuer |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-03-06 | ICSA-25-065-01: Hitachi Energy PCU400 | CISA |
| 2025-02-13 | ICSA-25-044-09: Siemens SCALANCE W700 IEEE 802.11ax | CISA |
| 2024-07-23 | ICSA-24-205-02: Hitachi Energy AFS/AFR Series Products | CISA |
| 2024-06-13 | ICSA-24-165-06: Siemens TIM 1531 IRC | CISA |
| 2024-06-13 | ICSA-24-165-11: Siemens SCALANCE XM-400, XR-500 | CISA |
| 2024-06-13 | ICSA-24-165-10: Siemens SIMATIC and SIPLUS | CISA |
| 2024-02-15 | ICSA-24-046-15: Siemens SINEC NMS | CISA |
Each milestone comes from a different source, so gaps between them are gaps in what those sources publish, not evidence that nothing happened. EPSS history for this CVE holds 6 points from 2026-11-05, tracked daily from 2026-11-05; earlier points are weekly, which dates a spike to within a week. Peak probability 5.0% on 2026-11-05.
Check whether a specific version is affected →
What each source publishes about which product versions carry this vulnerability, kept as written rather than merged. Absence here means no source has published applicability data, not that nothing is affected.
Coverage across public collections only: Nuclei and OpenVAS NVT (scan);
Snort and Suricata ET Open (network); Sigma and YARA (host/SIEM);
Metasploit, Exploit-DB, public GitHub repositories and NVD exploit references (exploit). Absence
here means nothing public was found, not that detection is impossible.
GitHub PoC repositories are collected automatically by
PoC-in-GitHub (CC0) and filtered to repositories that are
still online, contain code, and are starred or at least two weeks old. They are
still not vetted: some are fakes and some are malware. Treat
them as evidence that code was published, not as code to run.
NVD exploit references are links NVD's analysts tag as exploits; they confirm
an exploit was referenced but carry no date. This product uses data from the
NVD but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
OpenVAS coverage derives from the Greenbone Community Feed, made available
under the Open Database License (ODbL) v1.0;
its individual Vulnerability Tests are licensed
GNU GPL v2.
No exploit-tool sightings recorded for this CVE.
Metasploit is dated by the first commit of the module file, Exploit-DB by its publication date, and GitHub repositories by their creation date. GitHub PoC repositories are filtered (still online, contain code, starred or at least two weeks old) but not vetted: some are fakes and some are malware, so they show that code was published, not that it works or is safe to run. Evidence tiers are explained on the About page.
Where the distribution has shipped a fix, and in which version. Green means the release has resolved it, amber that it is still open. Data from the Debian Security Tracker, used under Debian's MIT / GPLv2+ terms. Debian is upstream of several other distributions, so a fix here often precedes theirs.
Patch and commit links and ecosystem advisory ids as published by OSV.dev. Links are listed as published, not vetted.
| If the asset is | Remediate within | Table 1 row |
|---|---|---|
| Publicly exposed | 14 days | 6 of 16 |
| Not publicly exposed | 60 days | 14 of 16 |
BOD 26-04 replaced the single KEV deadline of BOD 22-01 with four inputs: whether the asset is publicly exposed, KEV status, whether exploitation is automatable, and technical impact. Exposure belongs to each agency's asset, not to the CVE, so both outcomes are shown. Automatable and technical impact come from the CISA assessment above. Days are calendar days; for KEV entries the clock starts on the date it was added, and otherwise when the agency identifies the vulnerability on an asset. Agencies make the final exposure call asset by asset, and may set shorter timelines.
Defensive techniques inferred by MITRE D3FEND from the underlying weakness (CWE-416) — general hardening and detection guidance for this weakness class, not a vendor patch for this specific CVE.
CVE.org record → NVD entry → FortiGuard Labs → Rapid7 AttackerKB →