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CVE-2024-27013

Exploitation: none

CVSS base score: not scored

Vendor: Linux   Product: Linux

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tun: limit printing rate when illegal packet received by tun dev vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f

Research & News Coverage

No mentions found in monitored research blogs or news feeds.

Referenced in Advisories

DateAdvisoryIssuer
2025-08-14 ICSA-25-226-15: Siemens SINEC OS CISA
2024-04-11 ICSA-24-102-01: Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 TM MFP CISA

Lifecycle Timeline

Each milestone comes from a different source, so gaps between them are gaps in what those sources publish, not evidence that nothing happened. EPSS history for this CVE holds 3 points from 2026-11-05, tracked daily from 2026-11-05; earlier points are weekly, which dates a spike to within a week. Peak probability 0.3% on 2026-11-05.

Published Applicability

Red Hat CSAF/VEX 42 affected · 771 fixed · 8 not affected
OSV.dev (incl. GHSA) 15 affected · 15 fixed · 0 not affected
CVE List v5 (CNA container) 9 affected · 0 fixed · 9 not affected
CVE List v5 (ADP/Vulnrichment) 3 affected · 0 fixed · 1 not affected

Check whether a specific version is affected →

What each source publishes about which product versions carry this vulnerability, kept as written rather than merged. Absence here means no source has published applicability data, not that nothing is affected.

Detection & Exploitation

Scan
none published
Exploit / Pen Test
none published
Network IDS/IPS
none published
Host / SIEM
none published

Blind spot. No public detection — verify by version/patch. Nothing in the monitored scanner, IDS, SIEM or offensive-tool collections references this CVE, so exposure has to be established from asset inventory and patch level rather than from a signature.

Coverage across public collections only: Nuclei and OpenVAS NVT (scan); Snort and Suricata ET Open (network); Sigma and YARA (host/SIEM); Metasploit, Exploit-DB, public GitHub repositories and NVD exploit references (exploit). Absence here means nothing public was found, not that detection is impossible.
GitHub PoC repositories are collected automatically by PoC-in-GitHub (CC0) and filtered to repositories that are still online, contain code, and are starred or at least two weeks old. They are still not vetted: some are fakes and some are malware. Treat them as evidence that code was published, not as code to run.
NVD exploit references are links NVD's analysts tag as exploits; they confirm an exploit was referenced but carry no date. This product uses data from the NVD but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
OpenVAS coverage derives from the Greenbone Community Feed, made available under the Open Database License (ODbL) v1.0; its individual Vulnerability Tests are licensed GNU GPL v2.

No exploit-tool sightings recorded for this CVE.

Metasploit is dated by the first commit of the module file, Exploit-DB by its publication date, and GitHub repositories by their creation date. GitHub PoC repositories are filtered (still online, contain code, starred or at least two weeks old) but not vetted: some are fakes and some are malware, so they show that code was published, not that it works or is safe to run. Evidence tiers are explained on the About page.

Distribution Status

Debian · linux bookworm 6.1.90-1 trixie 6.8.9-1 forky 6.8.9-1 sid 6.8.9-1 scope: local

Where the distribution has shipped a fix, and in which version. Green means the release has resolved it, amber that it is still open. Data from the Debian Security Tracker, used under Debian's MIT / GPLv2+ terms. Debian is upstream of several other distributions, so a fix here often precedes theirs.

CISA Assessment (Vulnrichment / SSVC)

none
no
partial
—
—
2024-07-05

Federal Remediation Window (BOD 26-04)

No
no
partial control
If the asset isRemediate withinTable 1 row
Publicly exposed 60 days 8 of 16
Not publicly exposed Fix on system upgrade 16 of 16

BOD 26-04 replaced the single KEV deadline of BOD 22-01 with four inputs: whether the asset is publicly exposed, KEV status, whether exploitation is automatable, and technical impact. Exposure belongs to each agency's asset, not to the CVE, so both outcomes are shown. Automatable and technical impact come from the CISA assessment above. Days are calendar days; for KEV entries the clock starts on the date it was added, and otherwise when the agency identifies the vulnerability on an asset. Agencies make the final exposure call asset by asset, and may set shorter timelines.

External References