CVSS base score: not scored
Vendor: Linux Product: Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vhost/scsi: null-ptr-dereference in vhost_scsi_get_req() Since commit 3f8ca2e115e5 ("vhost/scsi: Extract common handling code from control queue handler") a null pointer dereference bug can be triggered when guest sends an SCSI AN request. In vhost_scsi_ctl_handle_vq(), `vc.target` is assigned with `&v_req.tmf.lun[1]` within a switch-case block and is then passed to vhost_scsi_get_req() which extracts `vc->req` and `tpg`. However, for a `VIRTIO_SCSI_T_AN_*` request, tpg is not required, so `vc.target` is set to NULL in this branch. Later, in vhost_scsi_get_req(), `vc->target` is dereferenced without being checked, leading to a null pointer dereference bug. This bug can be triggered from guest. When this bug occurs, the vhost_worker process is killed while holding `vq->mutex` and the corresponding tpg will remain occupied indefinitely. Below is the KASAN report: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 1 PID: 840 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.10.0+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:vhost_scsi_get_req+0x165/0x3a0 Code: 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 2b 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 65 30 4c 89 e2 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 4c 89 e2 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 be 01 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff888017affb50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88801b000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888017affcb8 RBP: ffff888017affb80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff888017affc88 R14: ffff888017affd1c R15: ffff888017993000 FS: 000055556e076500(0000) GS:ffff88806b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000200027c0 CR3: 0000000010ed0004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x86/0xa0 ? die_addr+0x4b/0xd0 ? exc_general_protection+0x163/0x260 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30 ? vhost_scsi_get_req+0x165/0x3a0 vhost_scsi_ctl_handle_vq+0x2a4/0xca0 ? __pfx_vhost_scsi_ctl_handle_vq+0x10/0x10 ? __switch_to+0x721/0xeb0 ? __schedule+0xda5/0x5710 ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x82/0xf0 vhost_scsi_ctl_handle_kick+0x52/0x90 vhost_run_work_list+0x134/0x1b0 vhost_task_fn+0x121/0x350 ... </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Let's add a check in vhost_scsi_get_req. [whitespace fixes]
No mentions found in monitored research blogs or news feeds.
| Date | Advisory | Issuer |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-08-14 | ICSA-25-226-07: Siemens Third-Party Components in SINEC OS | CISA |
Each milestone comes from a different source, so gaps between them are gaps in what those sources publish, not evidence that nothing happened. EPSS history for this CVE holds 4 points from 2026-11-05, tracked daily from 2026-11-05; earlier points are weekly, which dates a spike to within a week. Peak probability 0.3% on 2026-11-05.
Check whether a specific version is affected →
What each source publishes about which product versions carry this vulnerability, kept as written rather than merged. Absence here means no source has published applicability data, not that nothing is affected.
Coverage across public collections only: Nuclei and OpenVAS NVT (scan);
Snort and Suricata ET Open (network); Sigma and YARA (host/SIEM);
Metasploit, Exploit-DB, public GitHub repositories and NVD exploit references (exploit). Absence
here means nothing public was found, not that detection is impossible.
GitHub PoC repositories are collected automatically by
PoC-in-GitHub (CC0) and filtered to repositories that are
still online, contain code, and are starred or at least two weeks old. They are
still not vetted: some are fakes and some are malware. Treat
them as evidence that code was published, not as code to run.
NVD exploit references are links NVD's analysts tag as exploits; they confirm
an exploit was referenced but carry no date. This product uses data from the
NVD but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
OpenVAS coverage derives from the Greenbone Community Feed, made available
under the Open Database License (ODbL) v1.0;
its individual Vulnerability Tests are licensed
GNU GPL v2.
No exploit-tool sightings recorded for this CVE.
Metasploit is dated by the first commit of the module file, Exploit-DB by its publication date, and GitHub repositories by their creation date. GitHub PoC repositories are filtered (still online, contain code, starred or at least two weeks old) but not vetted: some are fakes and some are malware, so they show that code was published, not that it works or is safe to run. Evidence tiers are explained on the About page.
Where the distribution has shipped a fix, and in which version. Green means the release has resolved it, amber that it is still open. Data from the Debian Security Tracker, used under Debian's MIT / GPLv2+ terms. Debian is upstream of several other distributions, so a fix here often precedes theirs.
| If the asset is | Remediate within | Table 1 row |
|---|---|---|
| Publicly exposed | 60 days | 8 of 16 |
| Not publicly exposed | Fix on system upgrade | 16 of 16 |
BOD 26-04 replaced the single KEV deadline of BOD 22-01 with four inputs: whether the asset is publicly exposed, KEV status, whether exploitation is automatable, and technical impact. Exposure belongs to each agency's asset, not to the CVE, so both outcomes are shown. Automatable and technical impact come from the CISA assessment above. Days are calendar days; for KEV entries the clock starts on the date it was added, and otherwise when the agency identifies the vulnerability on an asset. Agencies make the final exposure call asset by asset, and may set shorter timelines.
CVE.org record → NVD entry → FortiGuard Labs → Rapid7 AttackerKB →