CVSS base score: not scored
Vendor: Linux Product: Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: resource: fix region_intersects() vs add_memory_driver_managed() On a system with CXL memory, the resource tree (/proc/iomem) related to CXL memory may look like something as follows. 490000000-50fffffff : CXL Window 0 490000000-50fffffff : region0 490000000-50fffffff : dax0.0 490000000-50fffffff : System RAM (kmem) Because drivers/dax/kmem.c calls add_memory_driver_managed() during onlining CXL memory, which makes "System RAM (kmem)" a descendant of "CXL Window X". This confuses region_intersects(), which expects all "System RAM" resources to be at the top level of iomem_resource. This can lead to bugs. For example, when the following command line is executed to write some memory in CXL memory range via /dev/mem, $ dd if=data of=/dev/mem bs=$((1 << 10)) seek=$((0x490000000 >> 10)) count=1 dd: error writing '/dev/mem': Bad address 1+0 records in 0+0 records out 0 bytes copied, 0.0283507 s, 0.0 kB/s the command fails as expected. However, the error code is wrong. It should be "Operation not permitted" instead of "Bad address". More seriously, the /dev/mem permission checking in devmem_is_allowed() passes incorrectly. Although the accessing is prevented later because ioremap() isn't allowed to map system RAM, it is a potential security issue. During command executing, the following warning is reported in the kernel log for calling ioremap() on system RAM. ioremap on RAM at 0x0000000490000000 - 0x0000000490000fff WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 416 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:216 __ioremap_caller.constprop.0+0x131/0x35d Call Trace: memremap+0xcb/0x184 xlate_dev_mem_ptr+0x25/0x2f write_mem+0x94/0xfb vfs_write+0x128/0x26d ksys_write+0xac/0xfe do_syscall_64+0x9a/0xfd entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 The details of command execution process are as follows. In the above resource tree, "System RAM" is a descendant of "CXL Window 0" instead of a top level resource. So, region_intersects() will report no System RAM resources in the CXL memory region incorrectly, because it only checks the top level resources. Consequently, devmem_is_allowed() will return 1 (allow access via /dev/mem) for CXL memory region incorrectly. Fortunately, ioremap() doesn't allow to map System RAM and reject the access. So, region_intersects() needs to be fixed to work correctly with the resource tree with "System RAM" not at top level as above. To fix it, if we found a unmatched resource in the top level, we will continue to search matched resources in its descendant resources. So, we will not miss any matched resources in resource tree anymore. In the new implementation, an example resource tree |------------- "CXL Window 0" ------------| |-- "System RAM" --| will behave similar as the following fake resource tree for region_intersects(, IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM, ), |-- "System RAM" --||-- "CXL Window 0a" --| Where "CXL Window 0a" is part of the original "CXL Window 0" that isn't covered by "System RAM".
No mentions found in monitored research blogs or news feeds.
| Date | Advisory | Issuer |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-08-14 | ICSA-25-226-07: Siemens Third-Party Components in SINEC OS | CISA |
Each milestone comes from a different source, so gaps between them are gaps in what those sources publish, not evidence that nothing happened. EPSS history for this CVE holds 3 points from 2026-11-05, tracked daily from 2026-11-05; earlier points are weekly, which dates a spike to within a week. Peak probability 0.3% on 2026-11-05.
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What each source publishes about which product versions carry this vulnerability, kept as written rather than merged. Absence here means no source has published applicability data, not that nothing is affected.
Blind spot. No public detection — verify by version/patch. Nothing in the monitored scanner, IDS, SIEM or offensive-tool collections references this CVE, so exposure has to be established from asset inventory and patch level rather than from a signature.
Coverage across public collections only: Nuclei and OpenVAS NVT (scan);
Snort and Suricata ET Open (network); Sigma and YARA (host/SIEM);
Metasploit, Exploit-DB, public GitHub repositories and NVD exploit references (exploit). Absence
here means nothing public was found, not that detection is impossible.
GitHub PoC repositories are collected automatically by
PoC-in-GitHub (CC0) and filtered to repositories that are
still online, contain code, and are starred or at least two weeks old. They are
still not vetted: some are fakes and some are malware. Treat
them as evidence that code was published, not as code to run.
NVD exploit references are links NVD's analysts tag as exploits; they confirm
an exploit was referenced but carry no date. This product uses data from the
NVD but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
OpenVAS coverage derives from the Greenbone Community Feed, made available
under the Open Database License (ODbL) v1.0;
its individual Vulnerability Tests are licensed
GNU GPL v2.
No exploit-tool sightings recorded for this CVE.
Metasploit is dated by the first commit of the module file, Exploit-DB by its publication date, and GitHub repositories by their creation date. GitHub PoC repositories are filtered (still online, contain code, starred or at least two weeks old) but not vetted: some are fakes and some are malware, so they show that code was published, not that it works or is safe to run. Evidence tiers are explained on the About page.
Where the distribution has shipped a fix, and in which version. Green means the release has resolved it, amber that it is still open. Data from the Debian Security Tracker, used under Debian's MIT / GPLv2+ terms. Debian is upstream of several other distributions, so a fix here often precedes theirs.
| If the asset is | Remediate within | Table 1 row |
|---|---|---|
| Publicly exposed | 60 days | 8 of 16 |
| Not publicly exposed | Fix on system upgrade | 16 of 16 |
BOD 26-04 replaced the single KEV deadline of BOD 22-01 with four inputs: whether the asset is publicly exposed, KEV status, whether exploitation is automatable, and technical impact. Exposure belongs to each agency's asset, not to the CVE, so both outcomes are shown. Automatable and technical impact come from the CISA assessment above. Days are calendar days; for KEV entries the clock starts on the date it was added, and otherwise when the agency identifies the vulnerability on an asset. Agencies make the final exposure call asset by asset, and may set shorter timelines.
CVE.org record → NVD entry → FortiGuard Labs → Rapid7 AttackerKB →