CVSS base score: 9.3 (Critical) vendor CNA · v4.0
Score assigned by the vendor's own CVE Numbering Authority (CNA); CISA's Vulnrichment program adds a score only when the CNA omits one. Vulnrichment source record →
Vendor: Canon Inc. Product: Satera LBP670C Series
Buffer overflow in print job processing by WSD on Small Office Multifunction Printers and Laser Printers(*) which may allow an attacker on the network segment to trigger the affected product being unresponsive or to execute arbitrary code. *: Satera LBP670C Series/Satera MF750C Series firmware v06.02 and earlier sold in Japan.Color imageCLASS LBP630C/Color imageCLASS MF650C Series/imageCLASS LBP230 Series/imageCLASS X LBP1238 II/imageCLASS MF450 Series/imageCLASS X MF1238 II/imageCLASS X MF1643i II/imageCLASS X MF1643iF II firmware v06.02 and earlier sold in US.i-SENSYS LBP630C Series/i-SENSYS MF650C Series/i-SENSYS LBP230 Series/1238P II/1238Pr II/i-SENSYS MF450 Series/i-SENSYS MF550 Series/1238i II/1238iF II/imageRUNNER 1643i II/imageRUNNER 1643iF II firmware v06.02 and earlier sold in Europe.
| Date | Source | Article |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-16 | Trend Micro ZDI | ZDI-26-203: (Pwn2Own) Canon imageCLASS MF654Cdw XML SOAP Request Parsing Heap-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
Articles from monitored vendor research blogs and security news feeds that specifically mention this CVE. Coverage begins when feed monitoring started; earlier articles are not indexed.
Each milestone comes from a different source, so gaps between them are gaps in what those sources publish, not evidence that nothing happened. EPSS history for this CVE holds 96 points from 2026-01-17, tracked daily from 2026-09-09; earlier points are weekly, which dates a spike to within a week. Peak probability 0.9% on 2026-09-12.
Check whether a specific version is affected →
What each source publishes about which product versions carry this vulnerability, kept as written rather than merged. Absence here means no source has published applicability data, not that nothing is affected.
Coverage across public collections only: Nuclei and OpenVAS NVT (scan);
Snort and Suricata ET Open (network); Sigma and YARA (host/SIEM);
Metasploit, Exploit-DB, public GitHub repositories and NVD exploit references (exploit). Absence
here means nothing public was found, not that detection is impossible.
GitHub PoC repositories are collected automatically by
PoC-in-GitHub (CC0) and filtered to repositories that are
still online, contain code, and are starred or at least two weeks old. They are
still not vetted: some are fakes and some are malware. Treat
them as evidence that code was published, not as code to run.
NVD exploit references are links NVD's analysts tag as exploits; they confirm
an exploit was referenced but carry no date. This product uses data from the
NVD but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
OpenVAS coverage derives from the Greenbone Community Feed, made available
under the Open Database License (ODbL) v1.0;
its individual Vulnerability Tests are licensed
GNU GPL v2.
No exploit-tool sightings recorded for this CVE.
Metasploit is dated by the first commit of the module file, Exploit-DB by its publication date, and GitHub repositories by their creation date. GitHub PoC repositories are filtered (still online, contain code, starred or at least two weeks old) but not vetted: some are fakes and some are malware, so they show that code was published, not that it works or is safe to run. Evidence tiers are explained on the About page.
| If the asset is | Remediate within | Table 1 row |
|---|---|---|
| Publicly exposed | 3 days | 5 of 16 |
| Not publicly exposed | 60 days | 13 of 16 |
BOD 26-04 replaced the single KEV deadline of BOD 22-01 with four inputs: whether the asset is publicly exposed, KEV status, whether exploitation is automatable, and technical impact. Exposure belongs to each agency's asset, not to the CVE, so both outcomes are shown. Automatable and technical impact come from the CISA assessment above. Days are calendar days; for KEV entries the clock starts on the date it was added, and otherwise when the agency identifies the vulnerability on an asset. Agencies make the final exposure call asset by asset, and may set shorter timelines.
Defensive techniques inferred by MITRE D3FEND from the underlying weakness (CWE-787) — general hardening and detection guidance for this weakness class, not a vendor patch for this specific CVE.
CVE.org record → NVD entry → FortiGuard Labs → Rapid7 AttackerKB →