CVSS base score: not scored
Vendor: Linux Product: Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Clear tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk in tcp_disconnect(). syzbot reported the splat below where a socket had tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk in the TCP_ESTABLISHED state. [0] syzbot reused the server-side TCP Fast Open socket as a new client before the TFO socket completes 3WHS: 1. accept() 2. connect(AF_UNSPEC) 3. connect() to another destination As of accept(), sk->sk_state is TCP_SYN_RECV, and tcp_disconnect() changes it to TCP_CLOSE and makes connect() possible, which restarts timers. Since tcp_disconnect() forgot to clear tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk, the retransmit timer triggered the warning and the intended packet was not retransmitted. Let's call reqsk_fastopen_remove() in tcp_disconnect(). [0]: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7)) Modules linked in: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-g201825fb4278 #62 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7)) Code: 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 8b af b8 08 00 00 48 89 fb 48 85 ed 0f 84 55 01 00 00 0f b6 47 12 3c 03 74 0c 0f b6 47 12 3c 04 74 04 90 <0f> 0b 90 48 8b 85 c0 00 00 00 48 89 ef 48 8b 40 30 e8 6a 4f 06 3e RSP: 0018:ffffc900002f8d40 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff888106911400 RCX: 0000000000000017 RDX: 0000000002517619 RSI: ffffffff83764080 RDI: ffff888106911400 RBP: ffff888106d5c000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffc900002f8de8 R10: 00000000000000c2 R11: ffffc900002f8ff8 R12: ffff888106911540 R13: ffff888106911480 R14: ffff888106911840 R15: ffffc900002f8de0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88907b768000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8044d69d90 CR3: 0000000002c30003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: <IRQ> tcp_write_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:738) call_timer_fn (kernel/time/timer.c:1747) __run_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1799 kernel/time/timer.c:2372) timer_expire_remote (kernel/time/timer.c:2385 kernel/time/timer.c:2376 kernel/time/timer.c:2135) tmigr_handle_remote_up (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:944 kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1035) __walk_groups.isra.0 (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:533 (discriminator 1)) tmigr_handle_remote (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1096) handle_softirqs (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 ./include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:580) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:614 kernel/softirq.c:453 kernel/softirq.c:680 kernel/softirq.c:696) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35)) </IRQ>
No mentions found in monitored research blogs or news feeds.
| Date | Advisory | Issuer |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-22 | ICSA-26-295-11: Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518(F)-4 PN/DP MFP | CISA |
| 2026-07-28 | ICSA-26-209-04: Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518(F)-4 PN/DP MFP | CISA |
Each milestone comes from a different source, so gaps between them are gaps in what those sources publish, not evidence that nothing happened. EPSS history for this CVE holds 3 points from 2026-11-05, tracked daily from 2026-11-05; earlier points are weekly, which dates a spike to within a week. Peak probability 0.2% on 2026-11-05.
Check whether a specific version is affected →
What each source publishes about which product versions carry this vulnerability, kept as written rather than merged. Absence here means no source has published applicability data, not that nothing is affected.
Blind spot. No public detection — verify by version/patch. Nothing in the monitored scanner, IDS, SIEM or offensive-tool collections references this CVE, so exposure has to be established from asset inventory and patch level rather than from a signature.
Coverage across public collections only: Nuclei and OpenVAS NVT (scan);
Snort and Suricata ET Open (network); Sigma and YARA (host/SIEM);
Metasploit, Exploit-DB, public GitHub repositories and NVD exploit references (exploit). Absence
here means nothing public was found, not that detection is impossible.
GitHub PoC repositories are collected automatically by
PoC-in-GitHub (CC0) and filtered to repositories that are
still online, contain code, and are starred or at least two weeks old. They are
still not vetted: some are fakes and some are malware. Treat
them as evidence that code was published, not as code to run.
NVD exploit references are links NVD's analysts tag as exploits; they confirm
an exploit was referenced but carry no date. This product uses data from the
NVD but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
OpenVAS coverage derives from the Greenbone Community Feed, made available
under the Open Database License (ODbL) v1.0;
its individual Vulnerability Tests are licensed
GNU GPL v2.
No exploit-tool sightings recorded for this CVE.
Metasploit is dated by the first commit of the module file, Exploit-DB by its publication date, and GitHub repositories by their creation date. GitHub PoC repositories are filtered (still online, contain code, starred or at least two weeks old) but not vetted: some are fakes and some are malware, so they show that code was published, not that it works or is safe to run. Evidence tiers are explained on the About page.
Where the distribution has shipped a fix, and in which version. Green means the release has resolved it, amber that it is still open. Data from the Debian Security Tracker, used under Debian's MIT / GPLv2+ terms. Debian is upstream of several other distributions, so a fix here often precedes theirs.
| If the asset is | Remediate within | Table 1 row |
|---|---|---|
| Publicly exposed | 14 days | 7 of 16 |
| Not publicly exposed | Fix on system upgrade | 15 of 16 |
BOD 26-04 replaced the single KEV deadline of BOD 22-01 with four inputs: whether the asset is publicly exposed, KEV status, whether exploitation is automatable, and technical impact. Exposure belongs to each agency's asset, not to the CVE, so both outcomes are shown. Automatable and technical impact come from the CISA assessment above. Days are calendar days; for KEV entries the clock starts on the date it was added, and otherwise when the agency identifies the vulnerability on an asset. Agencies make the final exposure call asset by asset, and may set shorter timelines.
CVE.org record → NVD entry → FortiGuard Labs → Rapid7 AttackerKB →