| 2026-06-02 |
CISA and Partners Urge Hardening Automatic Tank Gauge Systems
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the (EPA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)—hereafter referred to as “the authoring organizations”—are aware of malicious cyber activity targeting U.S.-based automatic tank gauge (ATG) systems.
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CISA
DOE
EPA
FBI
NSA
USDA
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| 2025-01-13 |
Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators When Selecting Digital Products
Many OT products are not designed and developed with Secure by Design principles1 and commonly have weaknesses, such as weak authentication, known software vulnerabilities, limited logging, insecure default settings and passwords, and insecure legacy protocols. Cyber threat actors can easily exploit these weaknesses across multiple victims to gain access to control systems.
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ASD/ACSC
BSI
CCCS
CISA
EPA
FBI
NCSC-NL
NCSC-NZ
NCSC-UK
NSA
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| 2024-03-21 |
PRC State-Sponsored Cyber Activity: Actions for Critical Infrastructure Leaders
This fact sheet provides an overview for executive leaders on the urgent risk posed by People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actors known as “Volt Typhoon.” CISA—along with the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other U.S. government and international partners1—released a major advisory on Feb. 7, 2024, in which the U.S.
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ASD/ACSC
CCCS
DOE
EPA
FBI
NCSC-NZ
NCSC-UK
NSA
Treasury
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| 2024-02-07 |
PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure
For a downloadable copy of indicators of compromise (IOCs), see: MAR-10448362.c1.v2.CLEAR_stix2.json (JSON, 51.
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ASD/ACSC
CCCS
CISA
DOE
EPA
FBI
NCSC-NZ
NCSC-UK
NIST
NSA
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| 2024-02-07 |
PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure
Prioritize patching critical sponsored cyber actors are seeking to prevulnerabilities in appliances known to be position themselves on IT networks for disruptive frequently exploited by Volt Typhoon. or destructive cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States.
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ASD/ACSC
CCCS
CISA
DOE
EPA
FBI
NCSC-NZ
NCSC-UK
NSA
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| 2024-02-07 |
CTR: Joint Guidance: Identifying and Mitigating Living Off the Land Techniques
This guide, authored by the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), agencies (hereafter referred to as the authoring agencies), provides information on common living off the land (LOTL) techniques and common gaps in cyber defense capabilities. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) U.S.
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ASD/ACSC
CCCS
CISA
DOE
EPA
FBI
NCSC-NZ
NCSC-UK
NSA
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