NCSC

NCSC-NL Co-Seal Profile

Joint Publications
11
All Time
Unique Partners
20
agencies co-sealed with
Most Frequent Partner
CISA
10 joint publications

Co-Sealed With

CISA 10
FBI 9
ASD/ACSC 7
CCCS 7
NCSC-NZ 7
NCSC-UK 6
NSA 6
BSI 6
DC3 3
EC3 3
HHS 2
EPA 2
Other 8

Partner Frequency — All Time

CISA
10
FBI
9
ASD/ACSC
7
CCCS
7
NCSC-NZ
7
NCSC-UK
6
NSA
6
BSI
6
DC3
3
EC3
3
HHS
2
EPA
2
ANSSI
1
CSA
1
NCO
1
NIS
1
NUKIB
1
DOE
1
TSA
1
OFAC
1
Joint Publications (11) — All Time
Date Publication Co-Sealers
2026-07-15 Establishing a Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Program to Work With Security Researchers This guidance outlines best practices for suppliers to design and implement a coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) program to effectively and transparently collaborate with security researchers to report and remediate vulnerabilities. CISA NCSC-UK NSA
2026-01-14 Secure Connectivity Principles for Operational Technology SSeeccuurree CCoonnnneeccttiivviittyy PPrriinncciipplleess ffoorr OOppeerraattiioonnaall TTeecchhnnoollooggyy ((OOTT)) Operational technology (OT) environments - which have long been centred on safety, uptime, and operational continuity - are now more interconnected than ever. ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK
2025-12-15 Principles for the Secure Integration of Artificial Intelligence in Operational Technology CISA | ASD’s ACSC | NSA AISC | FBI | Cyber Centre | BSI | NCSC-NL | NCSC-NZ | NCSC-UK Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Important Terminology ....................................................................................................................................... 3 Scope ................... ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA
2025-11-19 Bulletproof Defense: Mitigating Risks from Bulletproof Hosting Providers This document was developed through the Joint Ransomware Task Force (JRTF), a U.S. interagency body established by Congress in the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) to ensure unity of effort in combating the growing threat of ransomware attacks. ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA DC3 FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA
2025-11-13 #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware Actions for Organizations to Take Today to Mitigate Cyber Threats Related to Akira  Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.  Enable and enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA). CISA DC3 EC3 FBI HHS
2025-09-29 Creating and Maintaining a Definitive View of Your Operational Technology (OT) Architecture It is aimed at cyber security professionals working in organisations that deploy or operate OT across greenfield and brownfield deployments. Integrators and device manufactures can also use these principles to ensure their solutions enable effective asset and configuration management. ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK
2025-09-03 Joint Guidance: A Shared Vision of Software Bill Of Materials For Cybersecurity Widespread adoption of SBOM will strengthen security, reduce risk, and Most modern software is comprised of software components, modules, and libraries from open source and proprietary software worlds, rather than developers creating it from scratch. As concerns about the security and provenance of software grow, it is critical to understand the risks in the software’s supply chain— including the risks of the underlying software components. ANSSI ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA CSA NCO NCSC-NZ NIS NSA NUKIB
2025-08-13 Foundations for OT Cybersecurity: Asset Inventory Guidance for Owners and Operators Using these tools helps owners and operators identify which assets in their environment should be secured and protected, and structure their defenses accordingly to reduce the risk a cybersecurity incident poses to the organization’s mission and service continuity. An asset inventory is an organized, regularly updated list of an organization’s systems, hardware, and software. ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA DOE EPA FBI NCSC-NZ NSA
2025-01-13 Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators When Selecting Digital Products Many OT products are not designed and developed with Secure by Design principles1 and commonly have weaknesses, such as weak authentication, known software vulnerabilities, limited logging, insecure default settings and passwords, and insecure legacy protocols. Cyber threat actors can easily exploit these weaknesses across multiple victims to gain access to control systems. ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA EPA FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA TSA
2024-04-18 CISA and Partners Release Advisory on Akira Ransomware Today, CISA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), and the Netherlands’ National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NL) released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA), #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware , to disseminate known Akira ransomware tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) identified through FBI investigations as recently as February 2024. CISA EC3 FBI
2024-04-18 #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware Actions for Organizations to Take Today to Mitigate Cyber Threats Related to Akira  Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.  Enable and enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA). CISA DC3 EC3 FBI HHS OFAC