Joint Publications
7
All Time
Unique Partners
23
agencies co-sealed with
Most Frequent Partner
ASD/ACSC
7 joint publications

Co-Sealed With

CCCS 7
NSA 7
BSI 6
CISA 6
AIVD 5
DC3 5
FBI 5
MIVD 5
NUKIB 4
Other 26

Partner Frequency — All Time

7
NSA
7
BSI
6
6
5
DC3
5
FBI
5
5
4
3
3
AW
3
CNI
3
SKW
3
3
CSA
2
NIS
2
1
Joint Publications (7) — All Time
Date Publication Co-Sealers
2026-04-23 Defending Against China-Nexus Covert Networks of Compromised Devices Over the past few years there has been a major shift in the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by China-nexus cyber actors, moving away from the use of individually procured infrastructure, and towards the use of externally provisioned, large-scale networks of compromised devices. AIVD ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA DC3 FBI MIVD NCSC-NZ NCSC-SE NCSC-UK NSA
2026-04-23 International cyber agencies share fresh advice to defend against China-linked covert networks GCHQ’s National Cyber Security Centre with UK industry and 15 international partners shine light on best protections against methods used by China-linked threat actors. Covert networks, often made up of compromised devices such as smart devices, are being used to disguise the origins and attributions of cyber attacks. AIVD ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA DC3 FBI MIVD NCSC-NZ NCSC-SE NCSC-UK NSA
2026-03-13 CSI: AI ML Supply Chain Risks and Mitigations Supply chain risks and mitigations 2 Artificial intelligence and machine learning Supply chain risks and mitigations Artificial intelligence and machine learning Supply chain risks and mitigations 3 Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine with this, risks outlined in this guidance are learning (ML) systems allow organisations to mapped to the National Institute of Standards improve their efficiency in many areas. ASD/ACSC CCCS CSA NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NIS NSA
2025-09-03 Joint Guidance: A Shared Vision of Software Bill Of Materials For Cybersecurity Widespread adoption of SBOM will strengthen security, reduce risk, and Most modern software is comprised of software components, modules, and libraries from open source and proprietary software worlds, rather than developers creating it from scratch. As concerns about the security and provenance of software grow, it is critical to understand the risks in the software’s supply chain— including the risks of the underlying software components. ANSSI ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA CSA NCSC-NL NCSC-NZ NIS NSA NUKIB
2025-08-27 Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System Executive summary People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber threat actors are targeting networks globally, including, but not limited to, telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure networks. AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW SUPO
2025-08-27 Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks. AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW SUPO
2025-08-27 CSA: Countering China State Actors Compromise of Networks While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks. AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW SUPO