| 2026-04-23 |
Defending Against China-Nexus Covert Networks of Compromised Devices
Over the past few years there has been a major shift in the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by China-nexus cyber actors, moving away from the use of individually procured infrastructure, and towards the use of externally provisioned, large-scale networks of compromised devices.
|
AIVD
ASD/ACSC
BSI
CCCS
CISA
DC3
FBI
MIVD
NCSC-NZ
NCSC-SE
NCSC-UK
NSA
|
| 2026-04-23 |
International cyber agencies share fresh advice to defend against China-linked covert networks
GCHQ’s National Cyber Security Centre with UK industry and 15 international partners shine light on best protections against methods used by China-linked threat actors. Covert networks, often made up of compromised devices such as smart devices, are being used to disguise the origins and attributions of cyber attacks.
|
AIVD
ASD/ACSC
BSI
CCCS
CISA
DC3
FBI
MIVD
NCSC-NZ
NCSC-SE
NCSC-UK
NSA
|
| 2026-03-13 |
CSI: AI ML Supply Chain Risks and Mitigations
Supply chain risks and mitigations 2 Artificial intelligence and machine learning Supply chain risks and mitigations Artificial intelligence and machine learning Supply chain risks and mitigations 3 Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine with this, risks outlined in this guidance are learning (ML) systems allow organisations to mapped to the National Institute of Standards improve their efficiency in many areas.
|
ASD/ACSC
CCCS
CSA
NCSC-NZ
NCSC-UK
NIS
NSA
|
| 2025-09-03 |
Joint Guidance: A Shared Vision of Software Bill Of Materials For Cybersecurity
Widespread adoption of SBOM will strengthen security, reduce risk, and Most modern software is comprised of software components, modules, and libraries from open source and proprietary software worlds, rather than developers creating it from scratch. As concerns about the security and provenance of software grow, it is critical to understand the risks in the software’s supply chain— including the risks of the underlying software components.
|
ANSSI
ASD/ACSC
BSI
CCCS
CISA
CSA
NCSC-NL
NCSC-NZ
NIS
NSA
NUKIB
|
| 2025-08-27 |
Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System
Executive summary People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber threat actors are targeting networks globally, including, but not limited to, telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure networks.
|
AISE
AISI
AIVD
ASD/ACSC
AW
BSI
CCCS
CISA
CNI
DC3
FBI
MIVD
NCSC-NZ
NCSC-UK
NSA
NUKIB
SKW
SUPO
|
| 2025-08-27 |
Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System
While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks.
|
AISE
AISI
AIVD
ASD/ACSC
AW
BSI
CCCS
CISA
CNI
DC3
FBI
MIVD
NCSC-NZ
NCSC-UK
NSA
NUKIB
SKW
SUPO
|
| 2025-08-27 |
CSA: Countering China State Actors Compromise of Networks
While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks.
|
AISE
AISI
AIVD
ASD/ACSC
AW
BSI
CCCS
CISA
CNI
DC3
FBI
MIVD
NCSC-NZ
NCSC-UK
NSA
NUKIB
SKW
SUPO
|