NUKI

NUKIB Co-Seal Profile

Joint Publications
8
All Time
Unique Partners
35
agencies co-sealed with
Most Frequent Partner
ASD/ACSC
8 joint publications

Co-Sealed With

ASD/ACSC 8
CCCS 8
NSA 8
DC3 7
FBI 7
NCSC-NZ 7
NCSC-UK 7
BSI 7
CISA 6
MIVD 5
SKW 5
AISE 4
Other 48

Partner Frequency — All Time

ASD/ACSC
8
CCCS
8
NSA
8
DC3
7
FBI
7
NCSC-NZ
7
NCSC-UK
7
BSI
7
CISA
6
MIVD
5
SKW
5
AISE
4
AISI
4
AIVD
4
AW
4
CNI
4
SUPO
4
NCO
4
ANSSI
3
DDIS
2
EFIS
2
DOE
2
EC3
2
EPA
2
DCSA
1
DGSI
1
FDI
1
NCIS
1
NCSC-SE
1
SIS RM
1
Treasury
1
CSA
1
NCSC-NL
1
NIS
1
USCC
1
Joint Publications (8) — All Time
Date Publication Co-Sealers
2026-07-23 Russian State-Supported Cyber Actors Conduct Phishing Campaign Targeting Users of Zimbra Collaboration Suite Read our joint advisory on LAUNDRY BEAR's exploitation of Zimbra Collaboration Suite. AISE AISI AIVD ANSSI ASD/ACSC AW CCCS CISA CNI DC3 DCSA DDIS DGSI EFIS FBI FDI MIVD NCIS NCSC-NZ NCSC-SE NCSC-UK NSA SIS RM SKW SUPO Treasury
2025-12-09 Pro-Russia Hacktivists Conduct Opportunistic Attacks Against US and Global Critical Infrastructure Actions for Operational Technology Owners and Operators to Take Today to Mitigate Cyber Threats Related to Pro-Russia Hacktivists Activity Reduce exposure of operational technology (OT) assets to the public-facing internet. Adopt mature asset management processes, including mapping data flows and access points. Ensure that OT assets are using robust authentication procedures. ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA DC3 DOE EC3 EPA FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA
2025-12-09 Pro-Russia Hacktivists Conduct Opportunistic Attacks Against U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure FBI, CISA, National Security Agency (NSA), and the following partners—hereafter referred to as “the authoring organizations”—are releasing this joint advisory on the targeting of critical infrastructure by proRussia hacktivists: The authoring organizations assess pro-Russia hacktivist groups are conducting less sophisticated, lowerimpact attacks against critical infrastructure entities, compared to advanced persistent threat (APT) groups. ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS DC3 DOE EC3 EPA FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA
2025-09-03 Joint Guidance: A Shared Vision of Software Bill Of Materials For Cybersecurity Widespread adoption of SBOM will strengthen security, reduce risk, and Most modern software is comprised of software components, modules, and libraries from open source and proprietary software worlds, rather than developers creating it from scratch. As concerns about the security and provenance of software grow, it is critical to understand the risks in the software’s supply chain— including the risks of the underlying software components. ANSSI ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA CSA NCO NCSC-NL NCSC-NZ NIS NSA
2025-08-27 Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System Executive summary People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber threat actors are targeting networks globally, including, but not limited to, telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure networks. AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA SKW SUPO
2025-08-27 Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks. AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA SKW SUPO
2025-08-27 CSA: Countering China State Actors Compromise of Networks While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks. AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA SKW SUPO
2025-05-21 Russian GRU Targeting Western Logistics Entities and Technology Companies This joint cybersecurity advisory (CSA) highlights a Russian state-sponsored cyber those involved in the coordination, transport, and delivery of foreign assistance to Ukraine. Since 2022, Western logistics entities and IT companies have faced an elevated risk of targeting by the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (85th GTsSS), military unit 26165—tracked in the cybersecurity community under… ANSSI ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS DC3 DDIS EFIS FBI MIVD NCSC-UK NSA SKW USCC