MIVD

MIVD Co-Seal Profile

Joint Publications
11
All Time
Unique Partners
33
agencies co-sealed with
Most Frequent Partner
CCCS
11 joint publications

Co-Sealed With

CCCS 11
ASD/ACSC 10
FBI 10
NCSC-UK 10
NSA 10
CISA 9
AIVD 8
DC3 7
NCSC-NZ 7
BSI 6
NUKIB 5
SKW 5
Other 51

Partner Frequency — All Time

CCCS
11
ASD/ACSC
10
FBI
10
NCSC-UK
10
NSA
10
CISA
9
AIVD
8
DC3
7
NCSC-NZ
7
BSI
6
NUKIB
5
SKW
5
NCO
5
AISE
4
AISI
4
AW
4
CNI
4
SUPO
4
NCSC-SE
3
Treasury
3
USCC
3
CNMF
3
ANSSI
2
DDIS
2
EFIS
2
DCSA
1
DGSI
1
FDI
1
NCIS
1
SIS RM
1
NIST
1
CSA
1
NIS
1
Joint Publications (11) — All Time
Date Publication Co-Sealers
2026-07-23 Russian State-Supported Cyber Actors Conduct Phishing Campaign Targeting Users of Zimbra Collaboration Suite Read our joint advisory on LAUNDRY BEAR's exploitation of Zimbra Collaboration Suite. AISE AISI AIVD ANSSI ASD/ACSC AW CCCS CISA CNI DC3 DCSA DDIS DGSI EFIS FBI FDI NCIS NCSC-NZ NCSC-SE NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SIS RM SKW SUPO Treasury
2026-04-23 Defending Against China-Nexus Covert Networks of Compromised Devices Over the past few years there has been a major shift in the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by China-nexus cyber actors, moving away from the use of individually procured infrastructure, and towards the use of externally provisioned, large-scale networks of compromised devices. AIVD ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA DC3 FBI NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-SE NCSC-UK NSA
2026-04-23 International cyber agencies share fresh advice to defend against China-linked covert networks GCHQ’s National Cyber Security Centre with UK industry and 15 international partners shine light on best protections against methods used by China-linked threat actors. Covert networks, often made up of compromised devices such as smart devices, are being used to disguise the origins and attributions of cyber attacks. AIVD ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA DC3 FBI NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-SE NCSC-UK NSA
2025-08-27 Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System Executive summary People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber threat actors are targeting networks globally, including, but not limited to, telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure networks. AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW SUPO
2025-08-27 Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks. AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW SUPO
2025-08-27 CSA: Countering China State Actors Compromise of Networks While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks. AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW SUPO
2025-05-21 Russian GRU Targeting Western Logistics Entities and Technology Companies This joint cybersecurity advisory (CSA) highlights a Russian state-sponsored cyber those involved in the coordination, transport, and delivery of foreign assistance to Ukraine. Since 2022, Western logistics entities and IT companies have faced an elevated risk of targeting by the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (85th GTsSS), military unit 26165—tracked in the cybersecurity community under… ANSSI ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS DC3 DDIS EFIS FBI NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW USCC
2024-09-05 Russian Military Cyber Actors Target US and Global Critical Infrastructure GRU Unit 29155 cyber actors began deploying the destructive WhisperGate malware against multiple Ukrainian victim organizations as early as January 13, 2022. These cyber actors are separate from other known and more established GRU-affiliated cyber groups, such as Unit 26165 and  Prioritize routine system updates and remediate known exploited vulnerabilities.  Segment networks to prevent the spread of malicious activity. ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA CNMF FBI NCSC-UK NIST NSA Treasury USCC
2024-09-05 Russian Military Cyber Actors Target U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure GRU Unit 29155 cyber actors began deploying the destructive WhisperGate malware against multiple Ukrainian victim organizations as early as January 13, 2022. These cyber actors are separate from other known and more established GRU-affiliated cyber groups, such as Unit 26165 and  Prioritize routine system updates and remediate known exploited vulnerabilities.  Segment networks to prevent the spread of malicious activity. ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA CNMF FBI NCSC-UK NSA Treasury USCC
2024-08-21 ASD’s ACSC, CISA, FBI, and NSA, with the support of International Partners Release Best Practices for Event Logging and Threat Detection Logging priorities for enterprise mobility using mobile computing devices 10 Protecting event logs from unauthorised access, modification and deletion 11 This publication defines a baseline for event logging best practices to mitigate cyber threats. AIVD ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA CSA NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NIS NSA
2024-07-09 State-Sponsored Russian Media Leverages Meliorator Software for Foreign Malign Influence Activity Affiliates of RT (formerly Russia Today), a Russian state-sponsored media organization, used Meliorator—a covert artificial intelligence (AI) enhanced software package—to create fictitious online personas, representing a number of nationalities, to post content on X (formerly Twitter). AIVD CCCS CNMF FBI