NUKI

NUKIB Co-Seal Profile

Filtered: 2025-Q3
Joint Publications
4
2025-Q3
Unique Partners
22
agencies co-sealed with
Most Frequent Partner
ASD/ACSC
4 joint publications

Co-Sealed With

ASD/ACSC 4
BSI 4
CCCS 4
CISA 4
NCO 4
NCSC-NZ 4
NSA 4
AISE 3
AISI 3
AIVD 3
AW 3
CNI 3
Other 22

Partner Frequency — 2025-Q3

ASD/ACSC
4
BSI
4
CCCS
4
CISA
4
NCO
4
NCSC-NZ
4
NSA
4
AISE
3
AISI
3
AIVD
3
AW
3
CNI
3
DC3
3
FBI
3
MIVD
3
NCSC-UK
3
SKW
3
SUPO
3
ANSSI
1
CSA
1
NCSC-NL
1
NIS
1
Joint Publications (4) — 2025-Q3
Date Publication Co-Sealers
2025-09-03 Joint Guidance: A Shared Vision of Software Bill Of Materials For Cybersecurity Widespread adoption of SBOM will strengthen security, reduce risk, and Most modern software is comprised of software components, modules, and libraries from open source and proprietary software worlds, rather than developers creating it from scratch. As concerns about the security and provenance of software grow, it is critical to understand the risks in the software’s supply chain— including the risks of the underlying software components. ANSSI ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA CSA NCO NCSC-NL NCSC-NZ NIS NSA
2025-08-27 Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System Executive summary People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber threat actors are targeting networks globally, including, but not limited to, telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure networks. AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA SKW SUPO
2025-08-27 Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks. AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA SKW SUPO
2025-08-27 CSA: Countering China State Actors Compromise of Networks While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks. AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA SKW SUPO